Russia–Ukraine: turbulent diplomacy

Uneven terms

The text was replete with contradictions, ambiguities and errors that betrayed a lack of legal or diplomatic expertise. Some parts suggested direct translation from Russian, while others drew on the recent Gaza peace plan, which addressed a fundamentally different conflict. Even its status – both a ‘memorandum’ and ‘legally binding’ – was unclear.

The terms heavily favoured Moscow. Russia would gain Ukrainian land (and, though unstated, people) beyond what it already occupied; regain full access to the global economy; and enjoy an amnesty for war crimes. European states, though not consulted, would be prevented from deploying forces in Ukraine; obliged to lift sanctions; and compelled to give America frozen Russian assets held in European financial systems. Ukraine would face restrictions on the size of its military and receive no credible security guarantees.

Contentious questions remain

US-Ukrainian talks in Geneva on 23 November 2025, initially tense, produced a 19-point revised plan that left little of the original intact. Two questions reportedly remain unresolved and await decisions at the highest level: territory and security guarantees. These have always been the key issues. Ukraine could conceivably agree to a de facto loss of land in return for solid assurances of protection against future aggression. Yet Russia seeks not merely a small territorial gain – the area it claims would add barely 0.7% to its recognised land mass – but the full subordination of Ukraine as a political and cultural entity. Moscow would not agree to security guarantees for Kyiv that jeopardised this goal.

The contradiction between these two positions has underlain all peace talks since 2022. The frenzy of drafting and negotiation has not resolved it, and, in one respect, has made it more intractable. For America’s volatile diplomacy undermines the credibility of any security commitments that Washington might offer. Ukraine cannot be confident that a president who imposes an unfavourable peace would later risk war on its behalf should Russia violate the terms.

The war will only end if weakness compels either combatant, or both, to shift their position. If Ukraine faces irreversible collapse, it might conceivably agree to a peace that averts immediate disaster at the cost of permanent vulnerability. If Russia faces a full-blown systemic crisis at home due to the strains of major war and sanctions, it might be compelled to moderate its goal of dominating Ukraine.

Neither prospect is imminent. Although Ukraine faces setbacks on the battlefield, its resources are not close to exhaustion. Determination to resist remains strong: most Ukrainians understand the human consequences of Russian occupation. The corruption scandal that broke in Kyiv just before the peace plan emerged damages the standing of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration, but, unless this escalates into a national crisis of morale that jeopardises Ukraine’s war effort, it will not compel him to sign a bad peace.

Nor does Russia face an immediate crisis. Economic distortions are intensifying, and Russia’s dependence on oil revenues presents a growing vulnerability as the war-driven budget deficit rises. Ironically, America is helping to target this even as it pressures Ukraine. The first sanctions of Trump’s second term – on Russia’s two biggest oil companies – took effect as Driscoll arrived in Kyiv. Ukrainian attacks on oil infrastructure, aided by US intelligence, exacerbate their impact. However, these legal and kinetic measures against Russia’s petrodollar inflows are not yet enough to induce a crisis. Russia still presents an existential threat that Ukraine remains committed to resisting.

Present and future

The diplomacy continues. Witkoff will visit Moscow next week, and Zelenskyy may visit the White House. But Trump appears less invested in this plan than in his earlier diplomacy of the war and has signalled flexibility. Senior Russian officials insist that Moscow will make no concessions. President Vladimir Putin maintains that Ukraine lacks a legitimate government that can sign an agreement.  Meanwhile, Ukraine performs its gratitude to America for the peace plan while working to negotiate away unacceptable terms. If these talks fail, as previous ones have, the question will then be which country Trump blames and what consequences follow.

There are three broader lessons. Firstly, America still dominates the diplomacy of this war and sets the terms for negotiations – even when bearing a flawed proposal born of a chaotic process. Fear of antagonising Trump gives him power. Ukraine and Europe dare not say ‘no’; they can only say ‘yes, but...’, obliging them to invest in a process that is unlikely to succeed.

Secondly, while Trump had little hand in preparing this plan, he has once again sought to end the war primarily by pressuring Ukraine. It is a theory of peace he repeatedly returns to, despite its past failures and signs of growing frustration with Putin after the unsuccessful Alaska summit in August.

Thirdly, Europe’s weakness has been painfully exposed. Its posture is one of reactive dependence rather than strategic autonomy. Despite being the main source of Ukraine’s economic and military support, it is marginal to the diplomacy of the war and has done little more than offer amendments to America’s draft peace plan. Its failure to agree a plan to use frozen Russian financial assets to support Ukraine has enabled the US to demand these assets for its own use as post-war investments. If the European Union cannot push through its plan next month, Ukraine will face a US$60 billion budget deficit over the next two years that will severely hinder its ability to wage the war effectively.

This diplomacy marks the third major international attempt to regulate Russian-Ukrainian security relations, after the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in return for guarantees of sovereignty, and the 2014–15 Minsk Accords that led to a ceasefire after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine. Both failed when Russia violated them. The current attempt to end Russia’s second invasion is more chaotic than either of these. This leaves little room for optimism.

Nigel Gould-Davies