Вы здесь

What's Next for Israel?

The Israeli attack on Iran, which sparked an all-out war between the two countries, was meant to delay Iran's plans by two to three years. Its main goal was to delay the Iranians from swiftly obtaining the ability to develop a complete nuclear weapon, from increasing the number of ballistic missiles in their arsenal to around 8,000 in the next two years and from making progress toward implementing a major attack on Israel, which Israelis have dubbed the Iranian "plan of annihilation."

Meanwhile, it's also clear that Israel is trying to promote the downfall of the regime. That was evident in Monday's strikes, which were aimed at targets identified with the regime, like the headquarters of Iranian state television. But this is a more ambitious goal that probably isn't achievable. The rising number of Iranian civilians killed in the Israeli strikes may well produce the opposite effect, by leading part of the public to close ranks around their hated regime against the external threat.

Yet even after four days of war, enormous damage in Tehran and considerable damage in Tel Aviv, it's impossible to say that the goals, overt or less so, have been achieved or are even within reach. Have realistic goals even been set, or are the "goals" merely wishes?

Israel began the war brilliantly, but the military operation is far from over. There's uncertainty regarding the U.S. position as well as uncertainty over the scenarios for ending the war. And naturally, there is a fear that this will become a long war of attrition for which Israel isn't prepared.

Even as we are awed by the successes that the air force, Military Intelligence and the Mossad racked up during the attack, as well as the interceptions by our aerial defense systems and the daring of rescuers from the Home Front Command, we shouldn't ignore the basic fact that almost all recent governments failed to do anything to eliminate one critical gap. A sizable percentage of Israelis – tens of percent – have no accessible protection from rockets in the form of a nearby shelter or safe room. And many of them live in major cities.

Moreover, nobody prepared the public for the differences between missile fire from the Gaza Strip or Yemen and what residents of greater Tel Aviv and Haifa have experienced over the past few nights. After the Israel Defense Forces wisely destroyed the bulk of Hezbollah's missile threat, many Israelis presumably thought the major risk had been reduced.

As of Monday evening, 25 Israelis had been killed by Iran's massive missile strikes. Hundreds of others are wounded and dozens of buildings are either destroyed or will have to be demolished. This is damage on a scale that Israelis aren't used to – at least not those living in the center of the country.

Since the war began, Iran has launched some 350 ballistic missiles at Israel. More than 90 percent of them were either intercepted by our aerial defense systems or landed in open areas. And the number of people killed has been lower than the IDF General Staff initially predicted.

Obeying the Home Front Command's instructions and staying in a shelter or a safe room usually saves lives. To date, aside from those killed in a direct missile hit on a safe room in a building in Petah Tikva early Monday morning, no one has been killed in a safe room. But obviously, these are interim findings. A mass casualty incident, or a direct hit on a strategic asset or a site with symbolic importance would change the mood on the home front, which is already tense and anxious.

The IDF points out that one important advantage has been achieved – Israel has complete freedom of the skies in western Iran, achieved with the help of precise intelligence in real time. This goal was already achieved on Saturday, faster than the army expected, and it has enabled the air force to hit dozens of surface-to-surface missile launchers and hundreds of missiles. The attacks on senior officials are also continuing, though on a smaller scale.

The IDF describes this as acquiring the same freedom of action in the third circle – that is, Iran – as it has in the first, namely Gaza or Lebanon. Israel has thereby imitated the United States' tactic at the start of its two wars against Iraq, in 1991 and 2003 – "shock and awe," a method that relies mainly on the use of airpower.

Too good to be true

Where does Israel go from here? As written in these pages at the start of the war, the most important and decisive factor was the extent of American support for Israel. Will the public statements, the transfer of ammunition and the intelligence and air-defense assistance be translated to offensive measures? On Monday, there was a lot of focus on the movement of 30 U.S. refueling aircraft eastward from an American base.

In the first scenario, the Americans join in an attack on the Fordow nuclear facilities and other regime targets. That would change the balance of power entirely and realize Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's fantasies. However, Trump hasn't given any indication of moving in that direction, and the isolationist circles around him are strongly opposed to direct U.S. involvement.

In the second scenario, Trump urges Netanyahu to quickly end the war while he's ahead and forces a cease-fire on both sides, while trying to reach a new nuclear agreement with tougher conditions for Iran (the IDF hopes that they will be given more time to attack, despite the damage on the home front).

The third scenario – and perhaps the most dangerous – touches on a war of attrition. Israel could find itself in the same situation as Ukraine, which has been at war with Russia for more than three years. But at least Ukraine enjoys strong international support.

The Wall Street Journal reported on Monday that Iran has already relayed urgent signals of its desire to end the war and resume nuclear talks. According to the report, which is attributed to officials in the Middle East and Europe, Tehran conveyed these messages through Arab intermediaries to the United States and Israel.

This is very encouraging news, but raises a slight suspicion that at such an early stage in the war, it may be too good to be true. Iran has been hit hard by Israel, with attacks unprecedented in scope, but it's impossible to ignore the determination that the extremist regime has demonstrated to date. Moreover, the Journal (without involving its skilled staff in Israel) has been suspected in recent years of serving as a conduit for stories favorable to Netanyahu.

One person who is unwisely contributing to the accusations that Israel is deliberately targeting civilians in Tehran is Defense Minister Israel Katz. On Monday, following heavy shelling of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, Katz wrote on X that "the residents of Tehran will pay the price, and soon."

Such remarks entangle Israel, and Katz himself, with accusations of war crimes, precisely on the front where the IDF is more selective in its use of fire than in Gaza. Later, Katz was forced to issue a clarification. This is no longer a ridiculous matter, but one of real damage. Pilots are risking their lives in Iran, soldiers are being killed in Gaza and so are civilians on the home front – while for Katz, the war appears to be one big photo op. "He was, there is no kinder or gentler word for it, a fool," journalist David Halberstam said about Robert McNamara, the U.S. defense secretary during much of the Vietnam War.

Katz is the man Netanyahu chose to put into such a senior position in the midst of a war. What else keeps the prime minister busy during this difficult war, as he embarks on the most important strategic campaign of his life? On Monday, he appealed to the High Court of Justice to overturn the attorney general's opinion to enable Maj. Gen. David Zini, his candidate to lead the Shin Bet security agency, to be urgently appointed to the position after Ronen Bar stepped down a day earlier. The journey to dismantle democracy continues, despite the war in Iran, and may even accelerate under its auspices.

The calculations

To preserve the element of surprise, Netanyahu didn't bother to let the citizens of Israel in on his considerations on the eve of the attack. After the first attack, he explained that new intelligence had emerged in recent months that left him no choice but to act. Army Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, who now enjoys a high level of public trust, troubled to make clear that the decision to go to war was "businesslike and professional." But many former defense establishment officials have doubts, mainly about the prime minister's considerations, which have justifiably been questionable in recent years.

Intelligence officials told Haaretz on Monday that the Iranians exploited the lengthy negotiations over the Americans' return to the nuclear agreement, first at the end of President Joe Biden's term and then at the start of Trump's, to accelerate its nuclear project. Renewed work was identified in the project's weapons group, among others. Most of that group's leading scientists were killed in a targeted Israeli strike on the night of the first attack.

The army had recommended to undertake the operation in June, after several previous postponements, with the idea that capabilities to carry out opening moves would have been completed. However, waiting further could have led to gaps in the Iranian air defenses being closed. That is why the attack was launched when it was. There will be room to revisit these considerations, both while the war is fought, and even more so when it's over.

Amos Harel