A Multi-Layered Failure that Led to a Multi-Arena War
The sorrow on the face of the officer who filled one of the senior positions in Unit 8200 in recent years seems authentic this week. "We received all the budgets and resources we asked for, and we failed miserably," he told me in pain, without trying to sugarcoat the picture.
The statements were made against the backdrop of the publications about the exchange of emails and the warnings given by the Unit 8200 professional non-commissioned officer, who deciphered Hamas' plans in a precise and chilling manner. However, senior intelligence officers in the Southern Command and the Gaza Division dismissed her remarks as "imaginary."
The correspondence made waves through the unit's internal email and was exposed to many through a series of publications in the media. However, not everything came to light. It turns out that the intelligence had all of Hamas's plans, literally everything. Due to obvious reasons, it is not possible to specify here how detailed they were.
The disregard for the non-commissioned officer’s analysis, as well as the clear warnings provided by field observers along the Gaza border, recently revealed in the media, has drawn a great deal of attention. But the truth is, that the failure that preceded the October 7th war is multi-layered, deep, and thorough. Beyond the incomprehensible intelligence failure, there was also a shocking operational failure and a fundamental failure in understanding.
I'll delve into all of these layers with some new details, but let us start with the main battlegrounds in the eighth week of the war – beginning with the West Bank and Jerusalem: The attack in the bus stop in Jerusalem yesterday morning was a reminder that the Palestinian front is also simmering. As if we had forgotten.
The attack was carried out by terrorists with Israeli citizenship from East Jerusalem. However, beyond the checkpoints surrounding the capital, the number of alerts for attacks is breaking records. The main reason for the decrease in the actual number of attacks, compared to the bloodshed in the weeks leading up to the surprise attack in the Gaza-envelope communities, is primarily the shift of the Central Command and the Shin Bet to an offensive approach.
In the wake of what happened in Gaza, gloves are off also in the West Bank. Thus, a fighter jet bombed a mosque in Nablus, for the first time. The mosque has been known as a terror base since the days of the Second Intifada, but the IDF had not dared to attack it. Significant offensive actions have recently taken place in Tul Karem as well, and on Tuesday and Wednesday this week, the target once again was the Jenin refugee camp – a stronghold of Palestinian terror since the days of the Second Intifada.
Like the significant power dynamics in Gaza favoring the IDF, forces disproportionately superior to the enemy's expectations were deployed to the refugee camp. The forces included not only the Special Police Unit (Yamam), but also reserve forces from the Duvdevan unit, reservists from Division 464, combat engineers, and Border Police. Above them, an aerial vehicle hovered, launching an air-to-ground missile toward suspected figures, at least in one instance.
The operation was "inflated" in the statements of the Shin Bet and the IDF, even though in reality, the target was not one of the senior wanted figures in the territories, not even a "Top 10” terrorist. Instead, it was Muhammad Zubeidi, an activist of the Islamic Jihad, who received the bombastic title "Commander of the Jenin Refugee Camp" from the Shin Bet. It is doubtful whether Zubeidi himself knew he held such a title.
The truth is that Zubaidi was involved in attacks but received an "upgrade" in his status primarily due to his family name – he is the nephew of Zakaria Zubeidi, the infamous figure from the days of the Second Intifada two decades ago.
The targeting of Zubeidi, the nephew, specifically in the heart of the Jenin refugee camp, served as a kind of symbolic signaling to all the other terror strongholds in the territories. In any case, Muhammad Zubeidi had no chance against the forces that attacked him; he was killed in a hideout apartment together with the wanted figure Husam Hannoun, who was with him.
The operation was also entangled in controversy due to the killing of the 8-year-old boy, Adam al-Roul. The IDF claims that he attempted to throw an explosive device towards the forces, but due to his young age, it is challenging to convince Palestinians and the international media of this narrative. The propaganda on this issue is already full steam ahead.
Gaza: The hostage challenge
The situation in the West Bank is likely to recede from the headlines next week as the fighting in Gaza might resume in full force. According to all indications, the extension of the current truce, designed to receive an additional "portion" of captives each day, is likely to exhaust itself, and it is difficult to see Israel concluding the war without a change in the situation in the northern and southern parts of the strip. Especially after Prime Minister, Ministers Gantz and Galant, and essentially the entire top of the IDF, are committed to it, publicly as well.
The truce was not used by the political echelon for personal relaxation: As of this week, Defense Minister Gallant has still not seen his home since the morning of October 7. His wife, Claudine, provides him with an endless supply of buttoned-up black shirts – straight to the sleeping area in his office on the 14th floor of the IDF and Defense Ministry building in Tel Aviv.
Overall, the emotional return of over 100 captives so far is a significant achievement for Israel, and it can be attributed to the pressure exerted on Hamas by the successful ground maneuver of the IDF in the northern part of the Gaza Strip.
Nevertheless, there are still hostages held in Gaza, including dozens of male and female soldiers. There are also six missing persons whose fate currently remains unclear.
The return of the remaining Israeli captives from Gaza will become much more complicated when there is intense fighting in the Khan Yunis area, where most of them are presumably concentrated, and it is likely that top Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, are also present.
In retrospect, those who made the most of the ceasefire were Hamas terrorists who emerged from hiding, lifted their heads from the tunnels, scouted the locations of the IDF, passed intelligence on IDF weak points that they discovered during the fighting, and possibly also launched rocket launchers (there aren’t that many left) and planted explosives intended to harm our forces.
But the IDF also made excellent use of the time, not only to get some rest.
Lessons learned
The lessons learned process taking place in the IDF, while the war is still ongoing, is led by Brigadier General Guy Hazut, who returned to Israel from his regular assignment as a military attaché abroad.
The list of lessons learned, both positive and negative, is long and will continue to expand until the end of the war. Here are some positive aspects and areas for improvement.
Let’s start with something positive. The joint warfare between air, sea, and land forces has been proving its worth during the war – as has a major move regarding the evacuation of wounded soldiers. It turns out that before the war, the former commander of the Air Force, Amikam Norkin, decided to allocate entire reserve units of the elite 669 unit for aerial rescue to work closely with the ground forces.
Thus, the elite combatants of 669, including medics at the front lines, are deployed to every combat zone. The ground combat teams of 669 arrive immediately at the wounded and begin treating them on-site. They coordinate in advance with the mobile evacuation teams and know how to handle each injured individual. The IDF had hundreds of casualties in the battles in Gaza, and the unique evacuation method proved itself time and again, saving many lives.
And also this: The active defense system for protecting tanks and armored personnel carriers from anti-tank missiles (The Trophy system, known as "Windbreaker" in Israel) has demonstrated success rates much higher than expected.
Another significant success that warmed many hearts in the country is related to the performance of female combatants, particularly in the Armored Corps. This week, I was reminded of a comprehensive experiment to integrate women as tank fighters – from crew members to commanders – that was already conducted at the IDF Armored Training Formation in 1995 and achieved tremendous success.
Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff at the time, Lieutenant General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, decided not to continue with the initiative. During those days, women still did not serve in other combat roles in the IDF, and Israeli society was not yet ready for female tankers. Justice has finally been done, after almost 30 years.
Now, to one of the major challenges of the conflict so far: a very high rate of soldiers accidentally harmed by friendly fire, not by enemy forces. Missiles fired in the wrong direction, armored vehicles and tanks accidentally running over soldiers, tank fire mistakenly targeting our forces, and even artillery fire accidentally directed at our forces (resulting in the commander of the firing unit being relieved of duty).
These are just some of the incidents that are studied and investigated to minimize this phenomenon. It is characteristic of combat in a small area like the northern Gaza Strip but comes at too high a cost.
Waiting for a surprise
More about the truce. One shouldn't be overly impressed by the propaganda videos in which Hamas attempted to demonstrate control of the area during the release of the captives. The truth is that in the northern Gaza Strip, its situation is dire: its division and company commanders have already been targeted by the IDF, alongside thousands of fighters and hundreds of lower-ranking commanders.
Resistance to the IDF forces is still to be expected, mainly during the completion of the fighting in Hamas strongholds, which have not yet been thoroughly dealt with.
In the southern part of the Gaza Strip, the military challenge will be more difficult than in the north, especially when the order is given to move towards cities like Rafah and Khan Yunis – due to the presence of two million civilians alongside thousands of Hamas fighters. The population in the south now includes a million people who have already been asked to leave their homes in the north before the beginning of the ground maneuver.
Now, the IDF will need to find ways to operate in the south without endangering the captives and while avoiding harm to uninvolved civilians as much as possible (so far, there are, on average, three civilian casualties for every assassination of an "official" Hamas fighter in the fighting). Above all, the IDF must deal with the tunnels, where the majority of Hamas fighters are still located.
One can assume that the IDF still prioritizes operational plans for rescuing captives who are not included in the current agreement and for the elimination of Sinwar and Deif, which could alter the course of events. We'll keep our fingers crossed.
The Americans, in any case, continue to closely monitor the IDF's plans. They ensure that the IDF will continue to act strictly under international law and without a humanitarian crisis. They may not necessarily know this, but the IDF is experimenting with additional weapon systems. Regardless, they continue to supply Israel with massive quantities of ammunition and armored combat vehicles - by the hundreds of ships and planes so far.
It is important to understand that the "menu" of the fighting we saw during the turmoil in the northern Gaza Strip is not necessarily what awaits us in the next stage of the war, south of the Gaza River line. Both sides are preparing significant surprises for each other.
Indeed, it will be very surprising if there are no surprises. Not only on the battlefield: perhaps Sinwar will also surprise us with an unexpected deal for the return of the captives, which Israel will truly find it difficult to refuse, despite the public commitment to eliminate his organization.
The chiefs of the intelligence organizations in Israel, the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, who spent many hours together this week as well (the Egyptian and Qatari channels are conducted in parallel, not together), do not waste time on superficial conversations. The visit of the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, is also related to this and to discussions about the day after the war – which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not be able to avoid, despite the political risk involved, according to his perspective.
A dilemma in the north
Meanwhile, the situation in the north continues to pose a strategic dilemma for Israel: for eight weeks now, the communities along the northern border have been deserted.
It's hard to believe, but driving on Israel’s Northern Road, which connects the closest communities to the border – from Shlomi in the west to Manara and Misgav Am in the Galilee Panhandle, through Avivim, Yiftah, and countless other towns and villages – has been prohibited for the past two months.
Alongside the more internal roads, which Hezbollah does not directly target, one can observe the military preparations – company after company, division after division – tens of thousands of reservists and regular troops organized and ready for the command to go to war against Hezbollah, which has not yet been given.
On the tactical level, this week has been relatively quiet along the northern border, given the influence of the ongoing truce. Hezbollah fighters have returned to demonstrating a threatening presence along the border. On a deeper level, after weeks of prolonged fighting against Hezbollah, defined as "below the threshold of war," all the options Israel faces to address the situation are bleak.
One option is to hope that Hezbollah will withdraw its Radwan Forces north of the Litani River, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was adopted after the Second Lebanon War. However, the likelihood of this happening is low.
Therefore, if Israel wants the residents along the northern border to return to their homes after the October 7th massacre in the Gaza-adjacent communities, it must remove the direct threat from above them—by force. This is more or less what the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi HaLevi, heard from the heads of the communities when he met them at the Northern Command headquarters near Safed on Tuesday afternoon. The pressure on the IDF and the political echelon in this matter is massive.
A massive operational and conceptual failure
Back to the multi-layered failure. In addition to the significant intelligence failure, one cannot ignore the operational failure associated with the deployment of forces.
Even without prior warning, IDF forces were supposed to defend the border, but this week it became clear that not only were some of the armories locked (as already reported), not only were there no reserve forces along the border and not even artillery or mortar fire (due to excessive reliance on the barrier fence with its electronic systems and "see-shoot" system) – it turns out that the IDF did not follow even basic principles of soldiering and military discipline along the entire border.
The fear of weapon theft turned out to be greater than the fear of the enemy – that's why hundreds of administration soldiers, including the field observers, were not equipped with weapons at all. The combat soldiers' vests, didn’t even have grenades, only a few cartridges, and many of them ran out of bullets early in the battles.
Not to mention that there were no RPGs or other missiles available in the area as there used to be. Some of the soldiers in the line were injured in the chest because they didn't have ceramic vests. Dozens of soldiers were captured in their beds, even though anyone who served in the IDF knows what "readiness with dawn" means – to be fully prepared at the designated hour for a calamity.
It turns out that, contrary to what was once customary in the IDF in operational lines – to divide the leaves throughout the week – the IDF released no less than half of the soldiers in the line for the Simchat Torah holiday.
In the IDF bases and outposts, soldiers did not practice "camp defense," despite their proximity to the border, and they did not have the agreed-upon positions to which they must run during an attack. Instead, the procedure was to run to fortified rooms when there was rocket fire and shelling. Thus, when the surprise attack began, the tank crews aimed to seek shelter in fortified structures instead of their tanks. Hamas took advantage of this situation very effectively.
The time for the full description of the long list of operational failures, beyond those mentioned here, is yet to come.
Now, a point to consider regarding my operational failure, beyond the state policy of nurturing Hamas and oiling it with suitcases of dollars, which has been discussed extensively (even in real-time, by Avigdor Liberman).
Here is an example of a fundamental operational failure in military planning that must change: For years, the IDF has given absolute priority, in selecting manpower and allocating substantial budgets, to the intelligence and cyber units of the Intelligence Directorate and the Air Force.
This is reflected in budgets and the best personnel, including those with combat capabilities, being allocated to the intelligence and cyber units of the Intelligence Directorate and the Air Force.
The Ground Forces and the Navy were left with only scraps, relatively speaking. But at the crucial moment, on October 7th, at 6:30 AM, military intelligence was nonexistent, while the prestigious and massive Air Force only had two combat helicopters ready.
Therefore, their impact on the major security challenge in the history of the IDF since the Yom Kippur War has been more or less negligible (since they regrouped, of course, the military intelligence and Air Force have made significant contributions). Food for thought that will signal its importance in the dramatic changes that will be made in the IDF.
Amir Rapaport